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  Studies of federal prison sentences consistently find unexplained racial and 
gender disparities in the length of sentence and in the probability of receiving jail time 
and departures from the Sentencing Guidelines.  These disparities disfavor blacks, 
Hispanics, and men.  A problem with interpreting these studies is that the source of the 
disparities remains unidentified.  The gravest concern is that sentencing disparities are the 
result of prejudice, but other explanations have not been ruled out.  For example, wealth 
and quality of legal counsel are poorly controlled for and are undoubtedly correlated with 
race.  This paper uses the political, racial, and gender composition of the district court 
bench to estimate the effect of judicial demographics on sentencing and on observed 
racial and gender disparities.  The evidence presented here suggests that judicial 
demographics have little influence on prison sentences in general, but do impact racial 
and gender disparities.  The findings regarding gender in the case of serious offenses are 
quite striking: the greater the proportion of female judges in a district, the lower the 
gender disparity for that district.  I interpret this as evidence of a paternalistic bias among 
male judges that favors women. The racial composition of the bench h as mixed effects 
that are open to different interpretations.  The race and gender results suggest, however, 
that a judge’s background affects his or her sentencing decisions.  Finally, there is little 
evidence that the political composition of the district affects sentencing disparities.   
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 Congress passed t he Sentencing Reform Act  of 1984  in order to reduce 
“unwarranted sentencing disparities” in federal courts.  To this end, the Act created the 
United States Sentencing Commission, which oversees federal sentencing practices and 
maintains detailed sentencing guidelines that are binding on the federal judiciary.  
Despite these efforts, post-Guidelines studies consistently find  unexplained racial and 
gender disparities in sentencing disfavoring men and minorities.  A problem with 
interpreting these studies is that the source of the disparities remains unidentified.  The 
gravest concern is that they are the result of prejudice, but the possibility of unobserved 
variable bias remains.  For example, wealth and quality of legal counsel are poorly 
controlled for and are undoubtedly correlated with race.   
This paper uses the political, racial, and gender composition of the bench at the 
district level to estimate the effect of judicial demographics on sentencing  and on 
unexplained racial and gender disparities.  The paper thus makes two contributions to the 
literature.  First, it addresses whether or not judge characteristics affect judicial decision 
making.  Second, if racial and gender disparities are driven by judge characteristics, the 
source of sentencing disparities is at least partly the result of bias as opposed to 
legitimate, unobserved offender traits.
1  A finding that the political, racial, and gender 
composition of a district does not affect unexplained disparities would be consistent with 
the argument that disparities are  driven by unobserved (and potentially legitimate) 
considerations.  As discussed below, however, this conclusion would not be the only 
possible interpretation of a non-finding.   
                                                                 
1 As discussed in greater detail below, it would not be clear who is indulging a preference.  For example, if 
having more black judges on a district bench reduces the black disparity, it would not be clear whether 
black judges are giving black defendants an underserved break or white judges are being unduly harsh 
toward them (or unduly lenient to white defendants).    
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1. Judicial Characteristics and Case Outcomes  
 
  A large number of studies have addressed judicial characteristics and their effect 
on the case outcomes.  In addition to focusing on the judge’s political preferences (often 
imputed from the party of the appointing president or the appointing president), these 
studies have examined personal attributes of judges, such as race, religion, age, gender, 
and prior experience.   
  A recent survey of the literature regarding the impact of a judge’s age on 
decision-making concluded that “age is of minimal value in predicting how judges will 
vote, particularly once other variables are considered.”
2  For example, in a study with a 
sample of 2,258 district court cases, Ashenfelter et. al. (1995) could not establish an age 
effect.
3 
  Federal district court studies have not found consistent differences between male 
and female judges (see George, 2001, for a literature survey; see, e.g., Ashenfelter et al., 
1995).
4  Two courts of appeals studies, however, found that female circuit judges were 
more  sympathetic  to  sex discrimination  cases,  but found little evidence of other 
differences (Crowe, 1999; Songer et al. 1994).
5  Steffensmeier and Herbert (1999), in a 
study of Pennsylvania criminal cases,  found that female judges tended to sentence 
                                                                 
2 Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 Arizona L. Rev. 1, 17 (2001).   
3 Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case 
Outcomes, 24 J. Legal Stud. 257 (1995). 
4 Ashenfelter at 281; George at 18-21. 
5 Nancy E. Crowe, The Effects of Judges' Sex and Race on Judicial Decision Making on the United States 
Courts of Appeals, 1981-1996 (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago); Donald R. 
Songer et al., A Reappraisal of Diversification in the Federal Courts: Gender Effects in the Courts of 
Appeals, 56 J. Pol. 425, 436 (1994) (finding a weak impact on job discrimination decisions). 
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offenders more severely, were more likely to incarcerate minorities, and were less likely 
to incarcerate women.
6  
  The literature on judging has not produced consistent findings regarding the 
impact of a judge’s race on his or her decisions.  Some of these studies, however, use 
small numbers of minority judges to identify an effect because they examine circuit court 
decisions or only a few districts.
7   For some representative studies see Meritt et al. 
(2001); Ashenfelter et al. (1995); and Gottschall (1983).
8 
  Ashenfelter et al. (1995) fail to find any significant impact of appointing 
president, gender, religion, or race on the probability that civil rights cases filed in district 
court settle or win.  There was evidence, however, that judge characteristics affected 
certain procedural events such as discovery or referral to a magistrate, although political 
affiliation again had little explanatory power.  Ashenfelter et al. interpret this as evidence 
that the law largely controls the win and settlement rate of civil rights cases, while judges 
retain some discretion over procedure.   
                                                                 
6 Darrell Steffensmeier & Chris Herbert, Women and Men Policy Makers: Does the Judge’s Gender Affect 
the Sentencing of Criminal Defendants?, 77 Social Forces 1163 (1999). 
7 Ashenfelter et al. caution that their failure to find a measurable impact of a judges race should be 
interpreted in light of the few minority judges in the sample.  See also Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. 
Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 Vand. 
L. Rev. 1 (2001) (finding no relationship between race and decisions in unpublished unfair labor practices 
cases); Jon Gottschall,  Carter's Judicial Appointments: The Influence of Affirmative Action and Merit 
Selection on Voting on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 67 Judicature 165, 172-73 (1983) (finding some 
differences between black and white judges in prisoner cases, but little difference in race discrimination 
cases). 
8 Three studies on the effect of a judge’s race on sentencing have found mixed results.  However, they 
involved small sample sizes and examined state court judges in one city.  Welch et al. (1988) concluded, 
based on a northeastern city’s criminal court outcomes, that black judges’ incarceration decisions were 
indistinguishable from their white colleagues. Susan Welch et al., Do Black Judges Make a Difference?, 32 
Am. J. Pol. Sci. 126 (1988).  Two earlier studies likewise concluded that both white and black judges 
treated black defendants more harshly (Uhlman 1978, 1979).  Thomas Uhlman,  Racial  Justice: Black 
Judges and Defendants in an Urban Trial Court (1979) (concluding, based on an analysis of an urban 
criminal court, that black and white judges were both more severe on black defendants as compared to 
white ones); Thomas Uhlman, Black Elite Decision Making: The Case of Trial Judges, 22 Am. J. Pol Sci. 
884 (1978).  These district and city-level studies involved only a few minority judges.  It would be hard to 
conclude from them that there are no judge race effects whatsoever.   
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  Studies at the appellate level, where judicial discretion is arguably greater, have 
found consistent ideological effects in certain cases.  Cross and Tiller (1998) demonstrate 
that panel composition affects the outcome and structure of judicial opinions in 
administrative law cases.
9  Studies have also found that Reagan circuit court appointees 
are more  likely to vote for a  conservative outcome than Democratic appointees and 
previous Republican appointees (Gottschall 1986), while Clinton appointees have been 
found to be more liberal than Republican appointees but less liberal than Carter 
appointees (Stidham et al. 1996).
10  Haire et al. (1999) found that ideology affects the 
outcome of products liability cases on appeal,
11 and Smith and Tiller (2002) found that 
Republican appointees are more likely to vote against the Environmental Protection 
Agency than Democratic appointees.
12   
In sum, the literature has consistently established  that when judges have 
discretion, they indulge personal policy preferences to some extent.  To my knowledge, 
no study has examined the effect of political party or judicial characteristics on criminal 
sentencing at the federal level.   As discussed below, Judges have some discretion in 
sentencing, even under the restrictions of the Guidelines.  Sentencing is therefore a ripe 
area to study the effects of judicial background on decision-making.   
 
 
                                                                 
9 Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: 
Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 Yale L.J. 2155 (1998). 
10 Ronald Stidham et al., The Voting Behavior of President Clinton’s Judicial Appointees, 80 Judicature 16 
(1996). 
11 Susan Brodie Haire et al., Attorney Expertise, Litigant Success, and Judicial Decision-making in the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals, 33 L. & Soc'y Rev. 667 (1999). 
12 Joseph Smith & Emerson Tiller, The Strategy of Judging: Evidence from Administrative Law, J. Legal 
Stud 61 (2002).  
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2.  The Sentencing Guidelines and Sentencing Disparity 
The  Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 created  the United States Sentencing 
Commission and charged the Commission to develop sentencing guidelines that would 
“provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding 
unwarranted disparities among  defendants with similar records who have been found 
guilty of similar criminal conduct.”
13  Supporters of sentencing reform argued that 
judicial discretion was at the root of sentencing disparities between judges.
14   
The Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by the Sentencing Commission  greatly 
restrict the sentencing discretion traditionally vested in federal judges.  The 
“recommended” range is determined by the offense level and criminal history category.  
A district judge, with the aid of the probation officer, uses the Sentencing Commission’s 
regulations to calculate the defendant’s numeric “offense level.”  The crime of conviction 
sets the base offense level, with points being added based on the use of a gun, mitigating 
or aggravating role, the amount of drugs involved, the use of  sophisticated means in a 
fraud, whether a financial institution was affected, etc.  The defendant’s criminal history 
category is calculated based on the prior offenses committed by the defendant.  These 
two factors yield a sentencing range expressed in months.  All of these determinations are 
subject to appellate review.    
The 2001 Sentencing Guidelines T able is reproduced in Figure 1.  Provided the 
offense level and criminal history have not been miscalculated, a punishment within the 
                                                                 
13 28 U.S.C. § 991(b). 
14 For a discussion of the arguments made at the time, see Kate Stith and Jose A. Cabranes, FEAR OF 
JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998), 38-77, 104, and accompanying notes.  
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specified range cannot be appealed.
15   If a judge departs from the Guideline range, he 
must justify the departure by making a statement in open court or in a written opinion.  
The United States can appeal a downward departure, and the defendant can appeal an 
upward departure.
16  As can be seen from Figure 1, the sentencing range is roughly 25% 
of the maximum sentence.  The goal of these reforms was to reduce sentencing 
disparities, but the literature on variance in sentencing is divided as to whether between-
judge variation in sentences decreased significantly after the Guidelines.
17     
2.1 Racial and gender disparities under the Sentencing 
Guidelines 
  The Guidelines prohibit the consideration of race, sex, and national origin in 
sentencing decisions.
18  However, s tudies of sentencing disparities  consistently find 
unexplained racial and gender disparities disfavoring men, blacks, and Hispanics.  The 
most recent and most comprehensive study is by David Mustard (2001).
19  Mustard found 
significant racial and gender disparities in length of prison sentence even after accounting 
for position in the Guidelines sentencing grid (explained in greater detail below), offense 
type, education, income, and age.  While Mustard found that the majority of the racial 
disparity was due to departures from the Guidelines, blacks sentenced  within the 
                                                                 
15 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
16 Id. 
17 Hofer et al. (1999) argue that the Guidelines slightly decreased inter-judge sentence disparities.  Paul J. 
Hofer, Kevin R. Blackwell, & R. Barry Ruback, The Effect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on Inter-
judge Sentencing Disparity, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 239 (1999).  Anderson et al. (1999) found a 
decrease in inter-judge disparities in sentence length after the Guidelines, yet cautioned that the advent of 
mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses might have contributed to the decline.  John M. Anderson, 
Jeffrey R. Kling, and Kate Stith, Measuring Interjudge Sentencing Disparity: Before and After the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J. L. & ECON. 271 (1999).  On the other hand, Lacasse and Payne (1999) found 
that judges affected plea bargaining to roughly the same degree before and after the guidelines, indicating 
that judges remained as important as before.  Chantale Lacasse & A. Abigail Payne, Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines and Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Do Defendants Bargain in the Shadow of the Judge? 42 J. 
L. & ECON. 245 (1999).   
18 U.S.S.G. § 5H1.10. 
19 David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal 
Courts, 44 J. L. & ECON. 285 (2001). 
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specified Guideline range still had an average prison sentence more than two months 
longer than whites.
20  Mustard also considered the probability that any prison time was 
imposed and the probability that a judge departed from the Guidelines.  Again, he found 
unexplained race and gender disparities favoring whites and women.  Women fared better 
than men in all specifications, and the gender disparity was usually much larger than the 
estimated racial disparities.   
Steffensmeier and Demuth (2000),
21  Albonetti (1997),
22  and McDonald and 
Carlson (1993)
23  all  find racial or gender disparities under the Guidelines.  Pre-
Guidelines studies on state and federal sentencing practices have found similar evidence 
of racial and gender disparities (Spohn et al. 1985, Steffensmeier et al. 1993).
24   
Finally, there is evidence that the race, gender, and age of the victim play a role in 
sentencing.  Glaeser and Sacerdote (2003) f ound that punishments are harsher when 
victims are white or female.
25  Because the victims of minorities are disproportionately 
minorities, these effects would actually bias any estimate of the racial disparity 
downward.   
                                                                 
20 This disparity was present for nearly all types of offenses, but ranged from almost 10.5 months for drug 
trafficking to .91 months for fraud. 
21 Darrell Steffensmeier & Stephen Demuth, Ethnicity and Sentencing Outcomes in U.S. Federal Courts:  
Who is Punished More Harshly?, 65 Am. Sociological Rev. 705 (2000) 
22 Celesta A. Albonetti, Sentencing under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Effects of Defendant 
Characteristics, Guilty Pleas, and Departures on Sentence Outcomes for Drug Offenses, 1991-1992, 31 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 789 (1997). 
23 Douglas C. McDonald and Kenneth E. Carlson, SENTENCING IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: DOES RACE 
MATTER?, 177 (1993). 
24 Cassia Spohn, Susan Welch, & John Gruhl, Women Defendants in Court:  The Interaction Between Sex 
and Race in Convicting and Sentencing., 66 Social Science Quarterly 178 (1985); Darrell Steffensmeier, 
John Kramer, & Cathy Streifel, Gender and Imprisonment Decisions, 31Criminology 411 (1993). 
25 Edward Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote, Sentencing in Homicide Cases and the Roles of Vengeance, 32 J. 
Legal Stud. 363 (2003). 
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2.2 Competing explanations for the existence of racial and           
gender disparities 
 There are several observationally equivalent reasons why the  race and gender 
dummy variables  in sentencing regressions are significant and disfavor men and 
minorities.  An obvious explanation is that judges are biased for or against certain classes 
of defendants.  It is also possible that judges are engaged in “rational discrimination” 
against minorities and men because they perceive men and minorities as more dangerous 
and more likely to recidivate.  An explanation based on rational discrimination, while 
perhaps justifiable under an optimal deterrence model, remains objectionable in a system 
that adheres to principles of blind justice and equitable sentencing and is clearly contrary 
to the goals of the Sentencing Guidelines.    
Apart from discrimination, there are several sources of unobserved variable bias 
in studies of sentencing.  For example, there is reason to doubt the reliability of the 
income data collected by the Sentencing Commission.  The majority of defendants report 
little or no income, possibly to avoid paying restitution or fines.  Assets are not observed 
at all, and both income and assets are determinants of quality of legal counsel and hence 
will play a role in sentencing, offense level determination, and the probability of a 
downward departure.  These unobserved (or poorly observed) variables are undoubtedly 
correlated with race.   
In addition, there are potentially characteristics of a crime that justify disparate 
sentencing within the Guidelines.  The Guidelines recognize this and continue to leave 
some discretion to judges within the sentencing range and also permit departures 
provided the judge explains his or her reasoning in open court.  The heinousness and 
other unique characteristics of an offense are not fully observed.  Even when offense type 
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and offense level are controlled for, it is possible that a judge observes aspects of the 
crime that the econometrician does not.  If the severity of the crime  or individual 
blameworthiness is not fully controlled for and is correlated with race and gender, a 
disparity would be observed. 
Some scholars have interpreted the existence of a gender disparity that favors 
women as evidence that a paternalistic or chivalrous bias exists among judges (Belknap, 
2001; Edwards, 1989).
26  Others, however, have argued that the available evidence points 
toward the blameworthiness of the defendant and motherhood status as driving gender 
disparities (Spohn and Holleran, 2000; Steffensmeier et al. 1998; Steffensmeier et al. 
1993).
27  A potential unobservable is accomplice status.  If women are often accomplices 
in crimes, and if they are accomplices in a manner that the Guidelines do not fully 
account for, it is possible that the unexplained disparity is not motivated by bias.
28   
3.  Estimation Strategy 
  The basic model I estimate is as follows:   
         ijt ijt  jt 
ijt  jt  jt ijt t
j ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt
                            
                                  
    (1)
E xMinority BenchDemog
xFemale BenchDemog BenchDemog TrialType Term
District stics Characteri   Offense X Female Minority Sentence
+
+ + + +
+ + + + + =
a
y w h b
d q p g l
 
where i indexes individual offenders, j indexes district, and t indexes judicial term.  The 
dependant variable is length of prison sentence in months.  Probits on the same dependant 
                                                                 
26 Joanne Belknap, The Invisible Woman: Gender, Crime, and Justice (2001) [Wadsworth: Belmont, 
California]; Anne R. Edwards, Sex/Gender, Sexism, and Criminal Justice:  Some Theoretical 
Considerations, 17 Int’l J. Sociology L. 165[-184] (1989). 
27 Cassia Spohn & John Spears, The Imprisonment Penalty Paid by Young, Unemployed, Black and 
Hispanic Male Offenders, 38 Criminology 281 (2000); Darrell Steffensmeier, Jeffrey Ulmer, and John 
Kramer, The Interaction of Race, Gender, and Age in Criminal Sentencing: The Punishment Cost of Being 
Young, Black, and Male, 36 Criminology 763(1998); Darrell Steffensmeier, John Kramer, & Cathy Streifel, 
Gender and Imprisonment Decisions, 31 Criminology 411 (1993). 
28 For a discussion of how why judges may frequently view women offenders as acting in an accomplice 
role, see Steffensmeier et al. (1993) at 434-435. 
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variables are also estimated for whether or not the defendant was incarcerated or granted 
a downward departure. 
Minority is divided into four categories initially:  Black,  Hispanic,  Asian, and 
Other, with whites being the excluded group.    X represents a vector of individual 
offender characteristics such as age (entered as a quadratic), educational attainment 
(entered as dummy variables for high school, college, and advanced degree completion), 
citizenship status, and number of dependents (entered as dummies for zero, one, or two 
dependents).  Income, while certainly relevant, is not included because it was collected 
for only three years, and my identification strategy relies heavily on variation in the 
district courts over time.  As mentioned, the Guidelines prohibit the consideration of the 
race, gender, and citizenship status in sentencing.
29  Although the Sentencing Guidelines 
permit the consideration of the other individual variables in sentencing, the Commission 
has cautioned that they are “not ordinarily relevant” to determining the Guideline range 
or departures.
30   
Despite being discouraged or prohibited from consideration, these offender 
demographic variables are typically significant factors in sentencing regressions and are 
therefore included as  controls.  In addition, they are likely correlated with race and 
gender and therefore should be controlled for to the extent we are seeking to isolate race 
and gender effects.  In practice, the inclusion or exclusion of these variables made little 
difference to the coefficient estimates on the variables of interest.   
I control for offense characteristics in two ways.  First, I include a set of dummy 
variables for primary offense of conviction (murder, arson, drug trafficking, fraud, etc.).  
                                                                 
29 U.S.S.G. § 5H1.10. 
30 U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1-1.12. 
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Second, following the methodology of Mustard (2001), I include a dummy variable for 
each box on the sentencing grid.  The offense level of fourteen and criminal history level 
of two are the excluded categories.  Thus, each offense-criminal history combination has 
its own dummy variable.  In addition, some Guidelines recommendations are trumped by 
statutory  mandatory minimums, so I include the mandatory minimum sentence (when 
binding) as a control variable as well.  I also control for whether the trial was by jury or 
by bench, with pleas being the excluded category.   
Because I cannot match individual offenders to sentencing judges, I consider 
judicial characteristics at the district level.  Given that the average district has only 7.5 
judges, the addition or subtraction of a single judge can substantially alter the probability 
an offender is sentenced by a Democrat, female, or minority.  The Bench Demographic 
variables are average age of the district’s judges, percent Democratic appointees, percent 
female judges, percent black judges, and percent Hispanic judges.  If cases are assigned 
randomly within a district, the district demographics represent the probability of an 
offender being sentenced by a judge of that group.  Under this assumption, the coefficient 
on the Bench Demographic variable, ?, represents the impact on sentencing of increasing 
the composition of a district court by 1% of the category indicated.    
The  Black,  Hispanic, and  Female dummies are interacted with the  Bench 
Demographic variables except for the judge age variable.  As discussed, the age of the 
judge has generally not been shown to be an important factor influencing judicial 
decision making.  I continue to include it as a control variable, but its interactions with 
the offender characteristics were generally not significant.  For ease of reporting, I do not 
include this variable in the set of interactions.   
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If the assumption of random assignment within a district holds, the interaction 
coefficients ? and a are the effect on the unexplained disparity resulting from a one-
percent increase in the probability of being sentenced by a judge of the indicated group.  
Because the variables of interest are district-level variables interacted with an individual 
characteristic, I report Huber-White robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by 
district.   
The key variables of interest are the “own-effects” of judge and offender 
demographics (e.g., the coefficient on  the interaction between the female dummy  and 
percent female judges).  However, a number of interesting cross-effects were detected, so 
the full set of interactions is always included.  In addition, many minority and female 
judges were appointed by President Clinton, so the demographics of a district will be 
correlated with its political composition.  It is therefore important to include a full set of 
interaction terms for the political composition and the race and gender of the offender to 
disentangle these effects.   
District dummies are included in every regression, and should capture any 
district-specific effects.  In addition, the inclusion of district dummies means that the 
identifying variation in the political, racial, and gender composition of the district bench 
comes from intra-district variation.  Thus, concerns about non-random assignment (for 
example, Democrats or minorities being appointed to more high-crime districts) are 
lessened.  To capture any time-specific effects, I include dummies for Guideline term.   
It is possible that judges are not randomly assigned within a district.  For example, 
as Ashenfelter et al. (1995) point out, some judges in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
do not hear cases tried in Philadelphia.  They demonstrated that not accounting for this 
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would lead to an erroneous rejection of the random assignment hypothesis.  I present 
evidence below that indicates that minority judges are more likely to be in districts that 
have a greater proportion of minority defendants.  If these results carry over within a 
district, the probability a defendant is sentenced by a minority judge is actually greater 
than proportion of minority judges within a district.  Thus, the coefficient on the Race 
and Bench Demographic interactions may be overstated and must be interpreted with this 
caveat.  In addition, introducing minority or female judges to a district could affect the 
attitude of their white male colleagues toward minority and female defendants.  My 
estimation strategy cannot distinguish between judge-specific effects and the possibility 
that having female and minority judges on the bench may change the attitudes of other 
groups. 
There is an additional problem.  The general impact of offense types is captured 
by the offense-type dummy variables.  However, the dummies do not account for the 
possibility that Democratic, female, or minority judges may view certain crimes as more 
or less heinous than Republicans, men, or whites.
31  For example, if  Democratic 
appointees regard drug penalties as too harsh, they  may meet out lighter sentences for 
drug crimes.  However, because minorities commit a disproportionate number of drug 
crimes, under the specification above  the results could  misleadingly suggest  that 
Democrats are more lenient (and Republicans more harsh) toward minorities.  To check 
for this possibility, some specifications below interact the judicial demographic variables 
with the offense-type dummies. 
                                                                 
31 For example, Gruhl et al. (1981) found some evidence that female judges sentenced those who 
committed certain crimes more harshly than male judges.  
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  As a final note, while this paper is only concerned with the discretion vested in 
judges, it should be recalled throughout that prosecutors and law enforcement have a 
great deal of discretion as well, particularly over what charges to bring, the vigorousness 
of the prosecution, and the content of the plea agreement.  These factors will affect the 
offense level and whether charges are even brought.  The Guidelines did little to reduce 
and may in fact have increased prosecutorial discretion.  Instead of traditional charge 
bargaining, under which prosecutors agree to drop charges in exchange for a guilty plea, 
prosecutors may now pursue “offense-level” bargaining.  As Stith and Cabranes (1998) 
point out, this has increased the prosecution’s influence over the actual sentence because 
the base offense level is an important factor in determining the sentencing range.
32   My 
analysis considers the sentencing of the offender  after any prosecutorial biases  have 
already affected the calculation of the offense level or the bringing of a charge.
33 
 
4.  The Data 
  The data come from two sources.  The data on offenders sentenced under the 
Guidelines was collected by the United States Sentencing Commission, which collects 
information on every individual sentenced under the federal Sentencing Guidelines.
34  
The data on district-level judicial demographics comes from the Federal Judicial Center 
biographical data on federal judges.
35   
                                                                 
32 Stith & Cabranes at 130-33. 
33 It is possible that some prosecutorial bias is still captured by the results as the effectiveness with which 
prosecutors bring a case  
34 The data available from the University of Michigan’s ICPSR. 
35 History of the Federal Judiciary, available at http://www.fjc.gov (web site of the Federal Judicial Center, 
Washington, DC). 
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The  sentencing  data record important offense characteristics such as the 
offender’s criminal history, offense level, and the primary offense of sentencing.  The 
sentencing data also include a number of important offender characteristics, such as age, 
race, educational attainment, number of dependents, and citizenship status.  The source 
for this biographical information is the pre-sentence report prepared by the probation 
officer, which the judge relies upon in sentencing.   
Table  1  presents the means and proportions of variables of interest.  I use 
sentencing data between the 1992/93 Guideline term and the 2000/01 Guideline term 
(inclusive).
36  This yields a sentenced population of 437,649.  Because a number of key 
offender variables are missing for many individuals, the sample used was reduced to 
371,602.
37    
Significant differences  in the estimated effect of judicial characteristics  were 
apparent based on the type of offense committed.   For example, having more black 
judges on the bench did not affect the estimated black offender disparity for serious 
crimes such as murder and drug trafficking, but did affect the disparity for less serious 
crimes such as fraud.  Therefore, I divide the crimes into two categories: “Serious” and 
“Less-Serious”.    “Serious Crimes” are defined as murder, kidnapping, sexual abuse, 
assault, bank and other robbery, extortion, arson, any drug crime, any firearm crime, 
burglary, auto theft, racketeering, immigration offenses, pornography offenses, offenses 
committed in prison, and “other violent offenses”.  Serious offenses comprise the vast 
majority of sentenced offenders under the Guidelines.  With the exception of drug 
possession, each of the crimes labeled as “serious” received jail sentences 85% of the 
                                                                 
36 New Guidelines terms start in November. 
37 Mustard noted a similar reduction in the sample size because of missing variables.  Id. at 298. 
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time or more.  Incarceration was ordered in over 93% of serious crimes.  In the case of 
drug trafficking convictions, jail time was ordered over 95% of the time.   
The average length of prison sentence for serious crimes was 61.3 months.  The 
Guidelines abolished parole and only minimal time off is  granted for good behavior.  
Thus, the prison sentences imposed will closely reflect actual time served.  The 
maximum non-life prison sentence was 990 months, and life sentences were excluded 
from the analysis.  The inclusion or exclusion of life sentences (imputed from age of the 
defendant or top-coded) mattered very little to the final results, and they accounted for 
less than .04% of all sentences. 
 “Less  Serious Crimes” are defined as larceny, fraud, embezzlement, forgery, 
bribery, tax offenses, money laundering, gambling offenses, administration of justice 
offenses (obstruction), environmental offenses, and property offenses.  With the possible 
exception of gambling offenses,  these offenses  are basically “white-collar” crimes.  
Offenders received jail time in just over 55% of these cases.  The average sentence for 
less serious crimes was 11.0 months. 
Offenses counted in neither category are civil rights, environmental, national 
defense, antitrust, traffic,  “other environmental,” food and drug, and miscellaneous 
offenses.  These offenses are few in number and defied easy categorization.  (As noted 
below, I include these categories in the full-sample regressions.) 
Together, blacks and Hispanics account for nearly 61% of all those sentenced 
under the G uidelines in this period, and over 71% of serious offenders.  The racial 
categories sum to more than one because 4.2% of Hispanics are also identified as black.  I 
code these individuals as members of both racial categories in the estimation, but their 
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exclusion and inclusion had little effect on the results.  Men make up the vast majority of 
those sentenced under the Guidelines.  Men account for almost 90% of serious sentenced 
offenders and 63.5% of non-serious offenders.  Offenders who commit serious crimes are 
poorly educated, with 97% having a terminal degree of a high school education or less.  
Not surprisingly, those who commit less serious offenses are better educated and older.   
Apart from total prison sentence, other measures of punishment are also of 
interest.  First, there is the incarceration decision, already discussed.  Second, a judge 
may depart from the Guidelines.  Downward departures are of two types.  Substantial 
assistance downward departures are the result of defendant cooperation and must be 
initiated by the prosecution.   Other downward departures may be granted over the 
objections of the prosecution.   These include downward departures for family ties, 
overstatement of criminal history, and acceptance of responsibility.  A judge who makes 
a non-substantial assistance departure must justify the decision, which may be scrutinized 
by an appellate court.  Downward departures occurred in 31.5% of all sentences (35.2% 
of serious crimes and 22.3% of non-serious crimes).    The majority of downward 
departures were granted for substantial assistance (on the motion of the prosecution).
38   
Table 2 presents the type and distribution of offenses.  Offenders in federal courts 
commit different crimes from those in state courts, where most offenders are tried.  Not 
surprisingly, federal offenders are heavily concentrated in crimes that have interstate 
characteristics.  Forty-two percent of those sentenced under the federal Guidelines were 
sentenced for drug trafficking, over 13% were sentenced for fraud, and over 9.5% for 
                                                                 
38 Upward departures are rare events, occurring in less than 1% of all cases.  Examination of upward 
departures did not yield any significant results (perhaps because they are too rare to permit effective 
estimation) and are therefore not reported.   
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immigration offenses.  Over the nine Guideline terms in study, only 782 in the sample 
were sentenced for murder and 455 for manslaughter.   
Given the nature of the data, there are potential sources of bias that this study does 
not capture.  First, prosecutors and law enforcement agents have discretion over whom to 
prosecute and charges to bring.  Second, the data only cover those sentenced under the 
Guidelines, which means those who were convicted or pleaded guilty under the 
Guidelines.  While the vast majority of criminal indictments lead to plea bargains or 
convictions, I do not observe acquittals.  Therefore, all results are conditional on being 
and convicted or agreeing to a plea bargain. 
  Unfortunately, the data do not identify the sentencing judge, and the Sentencing 
Commission will not release the information.  Thus, I rely on district-level variation in 
the racial and gender composition of the federal courts to identify the effects of judge 
characteristics on the sentencing disparity.   I consider the composition of the district 
courts by active judges alone.
39 
  In order for district-level judicial demographics to have identifying power, 
substantial variation in the composition of the district courts has to occur over the time 
frame of the observations.  Figures 2 through 7 demonstrate substantial variation between 
1990 and 2002 in the political, racial, and gender composition of the district courts.  
Recall that the sentencing data are from the 92/93 to 00/01 Guideline terms.  The later 
                                                                 
39 Senior judges are partially retired and have greater discretion over their caseload.  In another unreported 
specification, I counted senior judges as half-time, and the results changed very little.  In any event, this 
group is almost 90% white men and for the most part merely changes the denominator of district 
demographics. 
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art4  20 
and earlier dates are included in the graphs for comparison purposes.  With 91 district 
courts, there are 819 district-year observations.
40   
  Over the time frame of the sample, Democratic appointees moved from being a 
minority of federal district judges, 23% in 1992, to a bare majority in 2000 and 2001 (see 
Figure 4).  The total number and relative percentage of female judges also substantially 
increased in this period, from roughly 12% of the federal bench in 1992 to nearly 20% by 
2001.  The same is true of black judges in this period, increasing from just over 6% of 
district court judges  in 1992 to over 11% in 2001.  Figures 6 and 7 demonstrate the 
numerical and percentage turnover of judges in a given term.    There i s clearly a 
substantial amount of churning in the district courts over the sample time frame.   
  Table 3 demonstrates the variation within the population of offenders of district-
level judicial demographics.  The mean percentage of female, black, and Hispanic judges 
in districts in which offenders were sentenced are 16.2%, 8.04%, and 7.92% respectively.  
Almost 94% of offenders were sentenced in districts with at least one Democratic 
appointee and over 66% were sentenced in a district with at least one female judge.  
Almost 60% of offenders were sentenced in a district with at least one black judge, and 
43% were sentenced in a district with at least one Hispanic judge. 
  It appears that blacks and Hispanics are more likely to be sentenced in districts 
with a greater proportion of black and Hispanic judges.  Tests for random distribution of 
judge and offenders by race all strongly rejected the hypothesis—districts with more 
black and Hispanic defendants have a greater proportion of black and Hispanic judges.  
(One heavily Hispanic district, Puerto Rico, had an entirely Hispanic bench during some 
                                                                 
40 The district courts for Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the North Mariana Island were excluded from 
the analysis. 
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judicial terms.)  Female offenders are actually slightly less likely to be sentenced in 
districts with a greater percentage of female judges.  This difference was also statistically 
significant.   
5.  Results   
  Table 4 presents OLS regressions on total prison sentence for all offense types.  
Table 5 presents the same results for serious crimes, and Table 6 repeats the exercise for 
less serious crimes using a Tobit regression because of the significant number of zero 
prison sentences.  Tables 7  and 8 present the probit results for incarceration  and 
downward departures.   
  The  first  column of Table 4 does not include the district-level interactions.  
Consistent with the previous studies, large unexplained gender and race disparities are 
observed.  In Column 1, women have sentences 7.6 months shorter than observationally 
equivalent men.  Blacks and Hispanics receive substantially longer sentences than 
observationally equivalent whites at 4.7 months and 1.6 months respectively.  Given an 
average sentence of 45.77 months, the relative size of the disparities for women and 
blacks are quite large.   
The coefficients on the offender demographic variables are consistent with 
previous work and signed as expected.  Age is positively but decreasingly associated with 
length of prison sentence, non-citizens receive 1.75-month longer sentences than citizens, 
better educated defendants receive shorter sentences (although whether this is a function 
of a bias in favor of education or wealth is unclear), and those with no dependants receive 
slightly longer sentences.    Similar results for offender personal traits are found 
throughout model specifications and across categories of crimes.   
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In the  remaining columns of Table 4, the main variables of interest are the 
district-level judicial demographic variables, which are italicized in the tables, and their 
interaction with the race and gender dummies.  Column 2 includes the entire sample.  
Columns 3 and 4 divide the sample into cases sentenced under any departure and those 
sentenced within the prescribed Guideline range.  These columns demonstrate that the 
bulk of the disparities come from departure sentences.  Although the race and gender 
dummies remain significant when the sample is divided into Guideline sentences and 
departures, the estimated female and black disparities for the departure cases in Column 3 
are over twice as large as the Guidelines cases in Column 4.  In addition, the individual 
offender demographic variables are not significant in Guidelines-only cases.  The R -
squared for the Guidelines regression in Column 4 is .8772.  Because the individual 
offender traits are largely insignificant, this suggests that the offense level, offense type, 
and criminal history largely determine sentences when the Guidelines are applied.  The 
R-squared for departure cases in Column 3 is only .5656, suggesting that much less 
variation is explained in cases sentenced outside of the Guidelines.   The key point, 
however, is that the estimated racial and gender disparities exist in both cases. 
Column 5 eliminates sentences in the A, B, and C range of the sentencing table.  
The Guidelines permit a portion of the sentences in these  ranges to be replaced by 
alternative forms of punishment such as probation, periodic imprisonment, or house-
arrest.
41  It is not clear how to impute a prison sentence from these alternative forms of 
punishment.  When these ranges are eliminated, over 96% of the remaining offenders 
receive a prison sentence.   In general, the estimated effects of the variables of interest 
remain quite similar when we remove the possibility of alternative sentences. 
                                                                 
41 See U.S.S.G. §§5B1.1, 5C1.1(d). 
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With the exception of the Percent Hispanic, the coefficients on the district-level 
judicial demographic variables are insignificant across specifications in Table 4.  This 
suggests that there is little impact on average sentences from having a greater proportion 
of female, Democratic, or black judges.  This is true both for cases in which the judge 
may have exercised substantial discretion in departures and for cases in which the judge 
sentenced within the Guidelines.   
It  is possible to interpret the positive and significant coefficient on  Percent 
Hispanic as suggestive of Hispanic judges being relatively harsher.  However, given that 
Hispanic judges are not randomly distributed across districts and  that  there was 
significantly less variation in the number of Hispanic judges over the time frame of the 
sample, I hesitate to make any firm conclusions in this regard.   
The interaction terms reveal some intriguing results which are replicated 
throughout this paper.  There is no evidence that women and minorities are sentenced 
differently in  more Democratic districts than in more Republican districts.  With  two 
exceptions discussed below, this result holds across crime categories and model 
specifications.  One must interpret non-findings carefully.  However, g iven the 
substantial amount of variation in the political composition of the federal district courts 
over time and across districts and the large sample size, one would have expected any 
sizeable ideological effect to be easily measured. 
Second, the greater the percentage of female judges on the district’s bench, the 
longer  the sentences received by female offenders.  The size of the coefficient on 
Female*%Female in Column 2 is .064.  If we boldly make an out-of-sample prediction, 
this suggests that a completely female district bench would result in an average sentence 
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of 6.4 months longer for female offenders than in an all-male district.  This would 
basically eliminate the estimated gender disparity of 7.6 months.   This finding is 
replicated in Columns 3, 4, and 5.  Such an interpretation may not be valid simply 
because it is out-of-sample and because a more female bench may affect male judges’ 
attitudes toward women in a legal setting.  It suggests, however, that the size of the 
estimated coefficient is both plausible  and consistent with the existence of a gender 
disparity emanating primarily from m ale judges.  In addition, the coefficient on the 
interaction term is significant at the 10% level in both Columns 3 and 4, when the sample 
is divided between departures and Guidelines cases, and becomes stronger in Column 5, 
when lower range offense levels are removed.  Finally, there are no female-judge effects 
detectable from the percent female judge and defendant race interactions.   
The percent black judge interactions suggest that having more black judges on the 
bench results in lighter sentences for women and Hispanics.  Interestingly, there is no 
discernable impact for black defendants, and the significant result for Hispanic 
defendants comes entirely from sentences within the range (non-departure cases).  There 
is weak evidence that Hispanic judges are lighter on black and Hispanic defendants.  The 
joint test of the Hispanic racial interactions is significant at barely the 10% level.   
The specification  reported in Table 4  reveals a strong, positive  female 
judge/female defendant effect, but weak and not entirely consistent race-of-judge effects.  
However, the division of the criminal categories into serious and non-serious crimes 
creates a clearer picture.  Table 5 limits the sample to those who were sentenced for 
“serious” crimes.  As discussed previously, imprisonment resulted in over 93% of cases 
defined as serious.    Column 3 includes interactions between offense categories  and 
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district demographics.  In addition, because 61% of serious crime sentences were for drug 
trafficking, I analyze drug trafficking and other serious crimes separately in Columns 4 
and 5.  
As in Table 4, there is no measurable impact on gender and racial disparities 
attributable to the political composition of the district bench.   Again, the  greater the 
percentage of female judges, the longer the prison sentences for women.  The inclusion of 
judge/offense category interactions in Column 3 does not change this result.  The female 
defendant/percent female judge coefficient is larger than that estimated in Table 5 and 
particularly strong for crimes other than drug trafficking (Column 4).  I could not reject 
the hypothesis that, with a 100% female district bench, the  female defendant/percent 
female judge coefficient exactly offsets the estimated gender disparity.  
The coefficients on race of defendant/race of judge interactions are quite similar 
to those in Table 4 but are much more precisely estimated.  While having more black 
judges in a district again has no measurable effect on the sentences received by black 
defendants, there is a discernable benefit to Hispanic defendants.  The coefficient on 
Hispanic*%Black Judge is not significant in Column 2, but is significant at less than the 
5% level in  Column 3 when judge/offense category interactions are included.    As 
Columns 4 and 5 demonstrate, judge/offense category interactions make a difference here 
because of the lighter sentences meted out solely to Hispanic drug trafficking offenders in 
districts with more black judges.  No percent black judge effect is evident on Hispanics 
who committed other serious offenses.
42  Interestingly, the bulk of the Hispanic racial 
                                                                 
42 The estimated Hispanic defendant/black judge interaction coefficient is quite large, implying that an all-
black bench would reduce the sentences received by Hispanic drug offenders by 24.8 months.  This is in 
contrast to an estimated Hispanic sentencing disparity of 7.66 months.  Thus, the magnitude of the 
interaction coefficient is quite large relative to the racial disparity.  This is not too disconcerting however.  
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disparity estimated previously seems to be attributable to differential sentences Hispanic 
drug traffickers received.  Thus, the fact that judge effects would be concentrated in this 
category is not too surprising. 
In contrast to Table 4, there is now a strong female defendant/percent black judge 
effect, suggesting that women receive lighter sentences in districts with more black 
judges.  This effect is robust across specifications, and evident both for drug trafficking 
and other serious crimes. 
Strong effects are observed for offender race/percent Hispanic judge interactions 
in Columns 2, 4 and 5.  The effect of having more Hispanic judges is roughly the same 
for both black and Hispanic defendants, and the joint effect is significant at less than the 
1% level.  However, when offense type was interacted with judicial demographics in 
Column 3, there is no measurable offender race/percent Hispanic judge effect.  This is 
particularly disconcerting as there is already less identifying variation  from  Hispanic 
judges.  As discussed, it is possible that judges view crimes differently, not criminals.  If 
Hispanic judges are more sympathetic to, say, immigration offenders and immigration 
offenders are disproportionately Hispanic, the correlation between percent Hispanic 
judges and the sentencing of Hispanic defendant may be spurious.  I say “may be 
spurious” because the judge could view a crime as more or less serious precisely because 
of the racial composition of the perpetrators, while treating all offenders in that category 
equally.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
First, statistical tests did not reject the hypothesis that the Hispanic defendant/black judge interaction 
exactly offsets the estimated Hispanic defendant disparity of 7.66 months.  Second, the black judge effect 
may be somewhat overstated to begin with if Hispanic defendants are more likely to be sentenced by a 
minority judge because of district rules. 
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This potential bias is not possible when drug trafficking alone  is examined in 
Column 5.  Within the category of drug trafficking crime, the greater the number of 
Hispanic judges in a district, the lighter the sentence on black and Hispanic  drug 
trafficking offenders.  Again, a bold out-of-sample prediction indicates that a 100% 
Hispanic district would eliminate all observed racial disparities in drug trafficking 
sentences.   
Thus, in the case of serious crimes, we can draw the following conclusions: (1) 
the greater the proportion of female judges in a district, the lower the gender disparity 
(i.e. the more men and women are treated alike); (2) the greater the proportion of black 
judges in a district, the larger the gender disparity; (3) there is little evidence that having 
more black judges reduces observed racial disparities (with the exception of disparities 
for Hispanic drug  traffickers); (4) there is evidence that having more Hispanic judges 
reduces racial disparities in drug trafficking sentences, although the same result for non-
drug crimes appears to be driven by differential sentences among crime categories, not 
criminals. 
Table 6 presents Tobit estimates for non-serious crimes.  Because of convergence 
problems when a large number of dummy variables were entered, criminal history and 
offense level are controlled for by quadratic terms in each and an interaction term 
between them.  As can be seen in Column 1, significant unexplained racial and gender 
disparities persist even for non-serious crimes.  The race and gender composition of the 
district bench again appears to have no measurable influence over prison sentences 
generally.  The political composition of the district possibly has an effect, however.  The 
coefficient on Percent Democrat is now positive and significant at the 6% level, implying 
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that less serious offenders may receive longer sentences the more Democratic the district 
bench. 
Different results are also obtained for the interaction terms.  First, an increase in 
the number of Democratic judges is now associated with lower sentences for Hispanic 
defendants.  Second, the female judge interaction terms are not significant at the 5% level 
for any group.  Third, the proportion of Hispanic judges in a district seems to have little 
effect on the sentencing of women or minorities.  Finally, black defendants sentenced in 
districts with a greater percentage of black judges have significantly lower sentences.  In 
fact, statistical tests indicate that an all black district court bench would more than offset 
the estimated racial disparity. The results are largely robust to the inclusion of offense-
type interactions in Column 3. 
Table 7 presents probit results for any jail time (dependent variable equals one if 
any jail time given, zero otherwise) and Table 8 presents probits for downward departures 
(dependant variable equals one if a departure is granted, zero otherwise).  Again, the 
sample is divided into the categories of “serious” and “less serious” crimes.  The sample 
sizes differ from the OLS and Tobit estimates for several reasons.  Some offense and 
criminal history levels were perfect predictors of prison sentences and those observations 
had to be dropped.  In the case of downward departures, any guideline range permitting a 
sentence of zero months had to be dropped (since downward departures are impossible in 
that case).   
As in the case of the total prison time regressions, large disparities disfavoring 
men, blacks, and Hispanics are observed almost across the board.  Translating the probit 
coefficients into percentage terms demonstrates that the magnitude of the disparities is 
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quite large.  For example, taking all other values at their means, a woman convicted of a 
serious crime is 5% less likely to be sentenced to jail time than a man and is 15% more 
likely to receive a downward departure. 
In the case of the decision to incarcerate, I find some evidence of a political 
composition effect on racial and gender disparities.  Hispanic defendants in relatively 
more Democratic districts are less likely to be  incarcerated for both serious and non-
serious crimes.  There is, however, no comparable  effect for  black defendants.  In 
addition, there is weak evidence that women who commit serious crimes are more likely 
to incarcerated in  relatively  more Democratic districts (the p -value on the 
Female*%Democratic coefficient was .052).   
Again, there are large estimated effects on racial disparities from having relatively 
more Hispanic judges, but these effects were not robust to the inclusion of judge/offense 
type interactions.  While t he results reported do not include  judge/offense type 
interactions, their inclusion made little difference except in the case of percent Hispanic 
judge interactions (as was the case in the OLS estimates of total prison sentence in Table 
5). 
Table 8 presents results for downward departures.  Columns 1 and 2 include all 
downward departures while Columns 3 and 4 exclude substantial assistance downward 
departures from the analysis.  Substantial assistance departures must be requested by the 
prosecution.  However, if bargaining occurs in the shadow of the judge, the reputation of 
the judge  or the district bench  may also influence whether the prosecution seeks a 
downward departure.  I therefore include them in the specification in Columns 1 and 2.  
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There is little evidence that  the composition of the district bench  affects 
downward departures in general.  The lone exceptions are the black defendant/percent 
Hispanic judge interaction and female defendant/percent Hispanic judge interaction.  The 
coefficients on these interactions indicate that black defendants are more likely to receive 
downward departures in districts with a greater percentage of Hispanic judges and female 
defendants less likely.  As with the previous percent Hispanic  judge interactions, 
however, these results were no longer significant after the inclusion of judge/offense type 
interactions.   
When substantial assistance departures are excluded, some interesting results are 
revealed.  The percent Hispanic judge interactions remain significant for serious crimes 
but, as before, are not robust to the inclusion of offense-type interactions.  In the case of 
less serious crimes, more Democratic district benches are less likely to grant downward 
departures to women.  In addition, black offenders in districts with a greater percentage 
of black judges are more likely to receive downward departures.   
In recognition of the complexity of the results, the interaction terms are 
summarized in the following tables.  A “-” indicates no significant effect.  
Results Summary 1:  Judge Effect on Total Prison Time 
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Results Summary 2:  Judge Effect on Probability of Incarceration 
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Results Summary 3:  Judge Effect on Probability of Judge-Initiated 
Downward Departures 
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* indicates insignificant result. 
+Note: Significant results for Hispanic judges were not robust to judge/offense type interactions. 
 
6. Conclusion 
  Despite large, persistent racial disparities in sentencing, the political, gender, and 
racial composition of a district’s bench has no general effect on the punishment of black 
and Hispanic offenders.  This result is n ot entirely consistent with any potential 
explanation behind unexplained racial disparities in sentencing.   
A tempting interpretation of this non-finding is that estimated racial disparities are 
not the result of bias but rather the result of poor controls for variables such as quality of 
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legal counsel or  the  heinousness of the crime.  Indeed,  there were no measurable 
differences in the way male and female judges, Democratic and Republican judges, and 
(with regard to serious crimes) black and white judges treated black offenders.  If racial 
prejudice on the part of judges, rational or otherwise, were behind sentencing disparities, 
one may well expect a judge’s background to correlate with disparate treatment.   
It is possible, however, to invent a story of multiple biases.  For example, while 
white judges may view black serious offenders as more dangerous, black judges may 
sympathize more with the disproportionately black victims of black crime.
43  This may 
lead to similar sentencing outcomes, but for very different reasons.   
In addition, the percentage of minority judges on the bench  had some effect on 
minority sentences.  In the case of less serious crimes, having a greater proportion of 
black judges reduced black-white disparities in total sentence and in the probability of 
receiving jail time and downward departures.  In districts with a greater proportion of 
Hispanic judges, the disparities between  black, Hispanic, and white  serious offenders 
were lower.  However, the results suggest that this effect may be caused by Hispanic 
judges’ attitude toward different offenses, not an offender’s personal characteristics.   
It is also possible that black judges could incorporate the biases of their white 
peers and consequently sentence black serious offenders in a similar manner.  The results 
are not entirely consistent with this theory either.  Having a greater proportion of black 
judges had little effect on the black-white disparity for serious crime, but it reduced 
disparities for blacks who committed less serious crimes and  for  Hispanic drug 
traffickers.   
                                                                 
43 Even when the crime may have unidentifiable victims, as in the case of drug trafficking, judges may 
perceive different impacts on different communities. 
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The results for female offenders in the case of serious crimes tell a clearer story.  
The greater the percentage of female judges on a district’s bench, the smaller the gender 
disparity.  These results are hard  to square  with the  suggestion that unobserved 
accomplice status or blameworthiness is behind the gender disparity.  At the very least, 
male and female judges view the dangerousness, accomplice status, or blameworthiness 
of female offenders differently. 
The female offender/percent female judge effects did not fully carry over to the 
probits on incarceration or downward departures for serious crime and were not evident 
at all in the category of less serious crimes.  (There was some evidence in the case of less 
serious crimes that more Democratic districts treated men and women  alike when 
granting downward departures.)  However, paternalistic views about the dangerousness 
or blameworthiness of female offenders may well be most evident in the case of serious 
crimes.  Similarly, most of the variation from the incarceration probit comes from very 
low offense levels, and hence does not pick up the effects of judges’ attitudes towards 
more serious offenses.   
  Even considering all of the caveats above, some firm conclusions can be reached.  
First, judicial background affects sentencing disparities, but not in ways that are easily 
predictable.  A number of significant effects were observed, even if they cannot be fully 
reconciled with a particular theory   
Second,  appointing more black judges to the bench is unlikely to reduce 
sentencing disparities for black offenders who commit serious crimes.  In districts with a 
greater percentage of black judges, disparities for Hispanic drug traffickers were reduced, 
but no similar benefit was received by black drug traffickers.   However, black offenders 
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who committed less serious crimes were sentenced lighter in districts with more black 
judges.   
Third, the political composition of the district court matters little to sentencing 
disparities.  No general political composition effects were observed.   The only observed 
percent Democrat/race effects were limited to Hispanic offenders, even though disparities 
are largest for black offenders.   
Finally, a greater proportion of female judges on the bench  is associated with a 
lower gender disparity for serious crimes.  This result is most easily reconciled with the 
idea that female offenders benefit from the paternalistic biases of male judges.   
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press  35 
 







http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art4  36 































































Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press  37 



























Total Number of Judges 












































































http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art4  38 
 
 












1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Year 
Judges Entering Active Service 























































































































Judges Entering Active Service 
Judges Leaving Active Service 
Total Number of Judges 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press  39 
 
Table 1:  Means and Proportions (Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
*“Serious Crimes” are defined as murder, kidnapping, sexual abuse, assault, bank and other robbery, extortion, arson, any drug crime, 
any firearm crime, burglary, auto theft, racketeering, immigration offenses, pornography offenses, offenses committed in prison, and 
“other violent offenses”.  With the exception of drug possession, these categories of crimes received jail sentences 85% of the time. 
** “Less serious” crimes are defined as larceny, fraud, embezzlement, forgery, bribery, tax offenses, money laundering, gambling, 
administration of justice offenses, environmental offenses, and property offenses.   Crimes counted in neither are civil rights, 
environmental, national defense, antitrust, food & drugs, traffic violations, and miscellaneous offenses. 
Variable  Mean or Proportion All 
Crimes 
Mean or Proportion Serious 
Crimes* 
Mean or Proportion 
Less-Serious** 






11.04   
(21.32) 






































































































































































































N  370,959  257,269  108,277 
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Table 2:  Offense Type and Distribution 
  




Murder  782  0.21  0.21 
Manslaughter  455  0.12  0.33 
Kidnapping/hostage taking  568  0.15  0.49 
Sexual abuse  1,860  0.50  0.99 
Assault  3,513  0.95  1.93 
Bank Robbery  14,125  3.80  5.73 
Other Robbery  1,091  0.29  6.03 
Extortion  1,110  0.30  6.33 
Arson  761  0.20  6.53 
Drug Trafficking  156,920  42.23  48.76 
Drugs: Comm. Facilities  3,120  0.84  49.60 
Drugs: simple possession  3,987  1.07  50.67 
Firearms: use  716  0.19  50.86 
Firearms: poss/trafficking  21,898  5.89  56.76 
Burglary  555  0.15  56.91 
Auto Theft  1,299  0.35  57.25 
Larceny   19,275  5.19  62.44 
Fraud   49,858  13.42  75.86 
Embezzlement   6,924  1.86  77.72 
Forgery or Counterfeiting  8,173  2.20  79.92 
Bribery   2,037  0.55  80.47 
Tax Offenses  6,523  1.76  82.23 
Money Laundering  6,923  1.86  84.09 
Racketeering   3,186  0.86  84.95 
Gambling   1,313  0.35  85.30 
Civil Rights Offense  863  0.23  85.53 
Immigration   35,871  9.65  95.18 
Pornography or Prostitution  2,253  0.61  95.79 
Offenses in Prisons  2,330  0.63  96.42 
Administration of Justice  6,060  1.63  98.05 
Environmental  1,151  0.31  98.36 
National Defense  179  0.05  98.41 
Antitrust   174  0.05  98.45 
Food and Drug  478  0.13  98.58 
Traffic Violations  121  0.03  98.61 
Other Violent Crime  683  0.18  98.80 
Other Drug  344  0.09  98.89 
Other Firearms  224  0.06  98.95 
Other Property  1,192  0.32  99.27 
Other Environmental  731  0.20  99.47 
Miscellaneous   1,869  0.50  99.97 
Missing  107  0.03  100.00 
Total  371,602  100.00  100.00 
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Table 3:  District-Level Judicial Demographics 
District-Year Variable  Mean 
(Standard Error) 
Minimum  Maximum 
Average Age  56.97 
(2.58) 
46.6  68.8 




0  100 
% Female Judges in District  16.2 
(14.0) 
0  55.7 
% Black Judges in District  8.04 
(8.09) 
0  50.00 
% Hispanic Judges in District  7.92 
(14.2) 
0  100 
% sentenced in Districts with 
any  Democrats 
93.5 
 
0  100 
% sentenced in Districts with 
any  Female 
66.7 
 
0  100 




0  100 




0  100 




0  55.7 




0  50.00 




0  100 
The percentages should be interpreted as the average percentage of female, black, or Hispanic judges in a 
district in which an offender was sentenced. 
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Table 4:  All Crimes 
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N  371,602  371,602  126,602  244,357  231,150 
R-Squared  .7068  .7069  .5656  .8772  .7094 
Joint Test of Race  
%Hispanic Int. 
   .0947  .5625  .4806  .0869 
Joint Test of Race 
%Black Int. 
  .0561  .5961  .0017  .1234 
 
***coefficient significant at less than 1% level, **coefficient significant at 5% level or less, * coefficient significant at 10% level or 
less.  All regressions include sentencing grid, district, judicial term, and offense type dummies, and a variable for statutory minimum 
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Table 5: Serious Crimes  
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Table 5: Serious Crimes 
***coefficient significant at less than 1% level, **coefficient significant at 5% level or less, * coefficient significant at 10% level or 
less.  All regressions include sentencing grid, district, judicial term, and offense type dummies, and a variable for statutory minimum 
sentence.  “Serious Crimes” are defined as murder, kidnapping, sexual abuse, assault, bank and other robbery, extortion, arson, any 
drug crime, any firearm crime, burglary, auto theft, racketeering, immigration offenses, pornography offenses, offenses committed in 







































































































































N  257,269  257,269  257,269  100,349  156,920 
R-Square  .6445  .6446  .7442  .6639  .6874 
Joint Test of Race  
%Hispanic Int. 
  .0022  .2982  .0006  .0014 
Joint Test of Race 
%Black Int. 
  .3342  .0342  .4116  .0125 
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Table 6:  Less Serious Crimes 
 























































































































































***coefficient significant at less than 1% level, **coefficient significant at 5% level or less, * coefficient significant at 10% level or 
less.  All regressions include district, judicial term, and offense-type dummies, and a variable for statutory minimum sentence.  
Offense level and criminal history are controlled for by quadratics in offense level and criminal history and an interaction term 
between offense level and criminal history.  “Non-Serious Crimes” are defined as larceny, fraud, embezzlement, forgery, bribery, tax 
offenses, money laundering, gambling, administration of justice offenses, environmental offenses, and property offenses.  Variables in 
italics are district-level variables. 
   

















































































N  108,277  108,277  108,277 
Pseudo R-Squared  .4040  .4043  .4048 
Joint Test of Race  
%Hispanic Int. 
  .2586  .4568 
Joint Test of Race 
%Black Int. 
  .0482  .0681 
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Table 7:  Probits on Jail Time  
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N  250,349  107,172 
Joint Test of Race  
%Hispanic Int. 
.0057  .2682 
Joint Test of Race 
%Black Int. 
.1345  .0051 
 
 
***coefficient significant at less than 1% level, **coefficient significant at 5% level or less, * coefficient significant at 10% level or 
less.  All regressions include sentencing grid, district, judicial term, and offense-type dummies, and a variable for statutory minimum 
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***coefficient significant at less than 1% level, **coefficient significant at 5% level or less, * coefficient significant at 
10% level or less.  All regressions include sentencing grid, district, judicial term, and offense-type dummies, and a variable 
for statutory minimum sentence.  In the “Downward Departure” probits, all observations for which the guidelines permit 
no jail time are eliminated.   
 





































































































































N  246,578  82,219  190,569  67,532 
Joint Test of 
Race  
%Hispanic Int. 
.0001  .9984  .0241  .4582 
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